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 In recent years, there has been a considerable degree of delegation from 
governments to quasi-autonomous agencies. Various reasons have been put 
forward to explain why governments decide to delegate authority in this 
way (Thatcher 2002, 129-139). Some reasons are based on a transactions 
cost approach, such as credible commitments. Other reasons are more 
contextual. For instance, governments may be responding to a process of 
cross-national policy transfer. In the literature on delegation some 
hypotheses have already been tested. Specifically, Gilardi (2002) has found 
evidence to suggest that governments create agencies to credibly commit to 
particular policy choices. However, other hypotheses, particularly ones based 
on contextual explanations, have proved much more difficult to 
operationalise. This article aims to help fill this gap. It does so by focusing 
on the creation of Independent Administrative Authorities (Autorités 
administratives indépendantes - AAIs) in France. We examine the reasons 
for their creation. Why have successive governments created so many AAIs 
in the last couple of decades? Does the qualitative evidence in this particular 
case corroborate the quantitative studies that have been undertaken 
elsewhere? What does the French example tell us about the more general 
literature on delegation? 
 
 
Explaining the Delegation of Authority to Quasi-Autonomous Agencies 
 
 The origins of the political science work on delegation lie in the study 
of the relationship between Congress and agencies in the United States (see, for 
example, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989). Increasingly, though, the 
study of delegation has incorporated a comparative dimension. For example, 
Mark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet (2002) have focused on delegation by 
governments to non-majoritarian institutions. They define delegation as “an 
authoritative decision, formalised as a matter of public law, that (a) transfers 
policy making authority away from established, representative organs (those 
that are directly elected, or are managed directly by elected politicians), to (b) a 
non-majoritarian institution, whether public or private” (ibid., 3). They define 
non-majoritarian institutions as “governmental entities that (a) possess and 
exercise some grant of specialised public authority, separate from that of other 
institutions, but (b) are neither directly elected by the people, nor directly 
managed by elected officials” (ibid., 2). Examples of such institutions include 
courts, central banks and independent regulatory authorities (IRAs). 
 Much of the comparative literature on delegation has focused on the 
reasons why governments delegate authority to non-majoritarian institutions 
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in the first place (e.g., Huber and Shipan 2002). What are the reasons why 
political actors grant discretion to quasi-autonomous agencies? 
Here, the literature to date has been dominated by principal-agent 
theory, which is based on a transaction costs approach. The logic of this 
approach is entirely functional. As Mark Thatcher (2002, 131) states: “IRAs 
performed functions that were useful for elected officials….” More specifically, 
Mark Pollack (2003, 21) states: “institutions serve to lower transaction costs and 
facilitate mutually advantageous cooperation among rational egoists….” 
Pollack (ibid.) identifies two main ways in which delegation may 
reduce transaction costs. It can help to reduce the costs associated with 
incomplete information. In other words, in areas of high policy complexity 
governments can benefit from delegating authority to technical experts. It can 
also help governments to credibly commit to various policy decisions. 
Governments have an inherent interest to renege on their promises in order to 
maximise their short-term self-interest, usually re-election. However, if 
governments delegate decision-making authority to a non-majoritarian 
institution, then they show that they can be trusted not to intervene in the 
decision-making process and policy-making may be more optimal. 
Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002, 4) identify two further ways in which 
delegation to non-majoritarian institutions may reduce transaction costs. 
Similar to the policy complexity argument, delegation can help to increase the 
efficiency of rule making. It can also help governments to shift the blame for 
unpopular policies from themselves to the representatives of the institution in 
question (Weaver 1986). Finally, Terry Moe (1995, 124) has argued that 
governments may choose to delegate power to an independent agency so as to 
prevent their political opponents from controlling the policy-making process 
when they take power. This argument assumes, rightly, that uncertainty is 
inherent in democratic political life. As a result, governments know that at 
some stage they will lose power and so they try to institutionalise their own 
preferences in the design of independent agencies. Moe states (1995, 136): “The 
group’s task in the current period … is to build agencies that are difficult for its 
opponents to gain control over later … this often means building agencies that 
are insulated from public authority in general—and thus from formal control 
by the group itself”. 
 In the comparative literature on delegation, some of these hypotheses 
have already been tested. For example, Gilardi (2002) has tested the credible-
commitment argument and has confirmed that governments do indeed seem to 
delegate powers to independent regulatory agencies in order to enhance the 
credibility of their policies. In other work, we have argued that the decision to 
delegate is a function of the desire to make a credible commitment and factors 
relating to policy complexity (Elgie and McMenamin 2005). Thus, evidence is 
starting to accumulate suggesting that a major motivation behind 
governments’ decisions to create quasi-independent agencies is to establish a 
credible commitment to policy outcomes. 
 3 
Even so, much work still needs to be done. To date, hypotheses have 
usually been tested on the basis of quantitative proxies and multiple regression 
analyses. This work is valuable. However, some variables are more tractable 
than others in this regard. For instance, it is notoriously difficult to test the 
blame-shifting hypothesis in these terms. Moreover, in his work Thatcher 
(2002) has been keen to move beyond such accounts. He argues “there is no 
automatic link between functional advantages of delegation and the creation of 
IRAs. Instead, the choice of delegation as a response must be explained rather 
than assumed. It must be analysed in its context as well as a response to 
pressures and functional advantages for governments and legislators” (ibid., 
136). 
In this regard, Thatcher identifies four other explanations (ibid., 136-
139). Firstly, the decision to delegate may be the result of a more general 
process of institutional isomorphism, or cross-national policy transfer. This 
process may include pressure from the European Union to harmonise 
regulatory structures (Majone 1996). Secondly, the decision to delegate may be 
mediated through long-standing state traditions. In some countries delegation 
may be a normal part of the political process. In others, it may mark a radical 
break with political practice. Thirdly, the decision to delegate may be the result 
of political leadership, or political entrepreneurship. A particular leader may 
wish to pursue delegation as part a personal or party political agenda. Finally, 
the decision to delegate may be part of a wider process of state reform. In some 
countries, there has been a general introduction of new public management 
reforms, of which the creation of agencies may be a constituent part. In other 
countries, though, the degree of reform has been much less pronounced. 
Overall, combining the various explanations, this leaves us with eight 
competing hypotheses. (See Table 1). 
 
[ TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
Case Selection and Methodology 
 
 In order to test the hypotheses identified in the previous section, we 
have chosen to examine the reasons for the creation of Independent 
Administrative Authorities (AAIs) in France. 
 In 2001, France’s highest court of administrative law, the Conseil d’État, 
defined AAIs as institutions that ‘act on behalf of the State without being 
subordinate to the Government and that, in order to carry out their tasks 
properly, benefit from guarantees which allow them to act with complete 
autonomy, such that their actions may not be influenced or sanctioned except 
by the courts. In order to fulfil this mission, they have varied sets of powers 
which, in some cases, give them the power of regulation, individual 
authorisation, control, injunction, sanction and, indeed, even appointment, but 
which, in other cases, is merely one of influence, even if this power is couched 
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in fairly formal terms so that it gives them a genuine moral authority’ (Conseil 
d’État 2001, 257). 
The Conseil d’État identified 34 AAIs or AAI-like institutions. They 
include standard regulatory authorities, such as the Commission des Opérations 
de Bourse (Stock Exchange Commission) and the Autorité de régulation des 
télécommunications (Telecommunications Regulatory Authority). They also 
include more diverse regulatory-like institutions, such as the Autorité de 
contrôle des nuisances sonores aéroportuaires (Authority for the Control of Airport 
Noise) and the Commission nationale de contrôle de la campagne électorale relative à 
l'élection du Président de la République (National Commission for the Control of 
the Presidential Election Campaign). Even though recent changes mean that 
the Conseil d’État’s list of AAIs is no longer definitive, the 2001 study is still the 
text of reference in this area. Therefore, this paper confines itself to the creation 
of the 34 institutions identified in Conseil d’État’s report. 
There are various reasons as to why AAIs constitute a particularly 
appropriate set of institutions with which to test the hypotheses identified in 
the previous section. Firstly, they are consistent with Thatcher and Stone 
Sweet’s (2002, 3) definition of non-majoritarian institutions. Secondly, they 
comprise a relatively large and heterogeneous set of non-majoritarian 
institutions. In previous studies, various authors have sometimes chosen only 
to study a fairly small number of classic IRAs. In so doing, though, they may 
have biased their findings in favour of certain hypotheses. Specifically, an IRA-
based study alone is likely to encourage support for a credible-commitment 
argument as, by definition, IRAs are often associated with the need for 
independent regulation of market-sensitive areas. So, by choosing to study a 
relatively large and heterogeneous set of non-majoritarian institutions, we 
reduce the likelihood that particular hypotheses will be favoured. Thirdly, by 
relying on a relatively large and heterogeneous set of non-majoritarian 
institutions defined by the Conseil d’État, we avoid any accusation of self-
inflicted selection bias. In short, we have to work with a set of institutions over 
which we have no choice, rather than selecting our own. 
Having chosen a set of institutions and justified the choice, we propose 
to test the eight hypotheses in two ways. Firstly, we wish to study the reasons 
for the creation of AAIs generally. Given we believe that there are advantages 
to studying a relatively large and heterogeneous set of institutions, it is 
important to explore all 34 of them. Therefore, in the next section we will take 
an overview of the reasons for the creation of AAIs in France and test the 
hypotheses on the basis of general information about the decision to delegate 
authority to them. We ask four questions. When were AAIs created? Which 
policy areas do they cover? How are they structured? What general reasons 
have been given as to their establishment? Secondly, while there are 
advantages to studying the whole set of AAIs, in so doing we may run the risk 
of glossing over important and more detailed evidence. Therefore, we will take 
two institutions and examine the reasons behind their creation in some detail. 
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(The choice of institutions will be justified when the time comes.) We firmly 
believe that there are distinct advantages to an approach that combines the 
equivalent of a relatively large-n study and a small-n study in one paper. In 
short, we believe that our findings are likely to be more robust if they are based 
on information from different types of investigation rather than only one. In 
other words, we would argue that, by itself, no single piece of information 
proves or disproves any of the eight hypotheses identified earlier. Instead, it is 
the accumulation of evidence across the different types of study that matters. 
Let us now turn to the reasons for the creation of AAIs generally. 
 
The Creation of Independent Administrative Authorities in France 
 
When were AAIs created? 
 
 The 34 AAIs, or AAI-like institutions, that the Conseil d’État identified 
were created between January 1941 and June 2000. There is some ambiguity in 
specifying exactly when certain institutions were established. For example, the 
Commission des opérations de bourse (COB) was created in September 1967, but it 
was only legally classified as an AAI as part of the July 1996 Law on the 
Modernisation of Financial Activities (loi no. 96-597). Once again, in order to 
avoid any personal judgement as to when particular institutions were created 
as AAIs, we have decided to rely on the dates provided by the Conseil d’État 
itself. For example, the Conseil d’État’s chronology suggests that the most 
appropriate date for the COB in this regard is 1996, rather than 1967. On this 
basis, we find that one AAI was created in the 1940s, two in the 1950s, one in 
the 1960s, five in the 1970s, 12 in the 1980s and 13 in the period 1990-2000 
inclusive. Further details about the 31 AAIs in the Conseil d’État’s inventory 
that were created during the Fifth Republic (1958-) are set out in Table 2. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
 In terms of when AAIs were created, there is prima facie evidence to 
support a small number of hypotheses. For example, the vast majority of AAIs 
were created after the 1980s. This timeframe roughly corresponds with the 
increasing Europeanisation of the policy process and, hence, evidence for 
institutional isomorphism, as well as the spread of new public management 
norms in OECD countries generally. In addition, nearly 40 per cent of all AAIs 
were created under just two governments, the governments of Michel Rocard 
and Lionel Jospin respectively. These figures might provide some evidence for 
the importance of political leadership, particularly as both leaders, and 
especially Rocard, were keen to promote state reform (Elgie 2003). By contrast, 
ideology does not appear to have been important. Delegation occurred under 
both left and right-wing governments. Moreover, the most neo-liberal-minded 
administration during the Fifth Republic, Jacques Chirac’s 1986-88 
government, was not associated with a high level of delegation. If we assume 
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that right-wing governments are more likely to be influenced by the 
principles of new public management, then the evidence contradicts the new 
public management hypothesis. By the same token, the fact that only six of the 
31 Fifth Republic AAIs were created in the 12-month period prior to a 
scheduled legislative election does not provide evidence of the policy 
uncertainty hypothesis. The legislative term is five years, so this figure 
corresponds to the annual percentage that would normally be expected. So, 
while there is some confirmatory prima facie evidence in some cases, there is 
also some disconfirming evidence. What is more, this sort of evidence cannot 
easily be used to test a number of hypotheses, such as blame shifting. (The 
findings are summarised in Table 3.) 
 
Which Policy Areas Do AAIs Cover? 
 
 In the French literature on AAIs, various attempts have been made to 
classify the different areas in which AAIs operate. For example, the Conseil 
d’État (2001, 307) states that AAIs are usually said to operate in two basic areas: 
regulation and the protection of civil liberties. Indeed, this is exactly the 
distinction made by Gentot (1994, 48). Moreover, consistent with this 
dichotomous classification, Jorion (1998, 41) states that AAIs operate in two 
sectors: the economy, as well as information and elections. That said, some 
writers have indicated that a broader classification schedule is more 
appropriate. For example, Guédon (1991, 17) states that they operate in three 
general areas: the battle against red tape, the regulation of the market 
economy, and the information and communications sector. What is more, she 
then goes on to suggest (ibid., 18) that in this latter sector there are three sub-
sectors: the regulation of broadcasting, political life, and scientific and 
technological activity. Finally, the Conseil d’État (2001, 307) itself has declared 
that a broader perspective is more appropriate. In its report, the Conseil d’État 
identified five general areas in which AAIs now operate: ombudsmen and 
mediation, regulation, the protection of civil liberties, as institutions that 
safeguard the public against arbitrary decisions by the state, and in a residual 
area that brings together a heterogeneous set of institutions, such as the anti-
doping authority, the Conseil de prévention et de lutte contre le dopage. 
 The presence of AAIs in the above areas provides evidence to support 
various hypotheses. Most importantly, it helps to support the credible 
commitment hypothesis. The literature on this topic invariably focuses on the 
economy as well as the more general need for independent agencies to regulate 
activity in areas where otherwise the government would be tempted to 
intervene. Whatever the classifications that individual writers have proposed, 
all of them state that AAIs operate in the area of the economy and regulation. 
Moreover, many state that they also operate in areas where individuals or 
groups need to be protected from the possibility of government intervention. 
In addition, there is also some support for the institutional isomorphism and 
new public management hypotheses. In terms of institutional isomorphism, 
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while it is beyond the scope of this article to demonstrate the point, we can 
assert with some justification that several of the AAIs in France are similar to 
institutions found elsewhere, notably classic IRAs such as the Autorité de 
régulation des telecommunications. As for new public management, the various 
ombudsmen, namely the Médiateur de la République, the Défenseur des enfants 
and the Médiateur du cinema, are entirely consistent with the basic principles of 
new public management reform. In addition, if we accept Guédon’s 
classification, then there is also some support for the policy complexity 
hypothesis. The creation of AAIs in areas where there is scientific and 
technological activity suggests that the government has accepted the need to 
delegate decision-making authority to policy experts. Finally, the list of AAIs 
seems to contradict some of the established wisdom about the tradition of state 
intervention in France and, thus, weakens this hypothesis. In some respects, 
the fact that AAIs exist at all runs contrary to the French tradition of 
administrative law and the organisation of the state. Indeed, Jorion (1998, 42) 
says that they mark a “completely remarkable rupture with the Napoleonic 
conception of a hierarchical system where the administration is subject to the 
orders of the executive” (all translations from the French are by the author). 
However, the fact that there are AAIs operating in areas such as the regulation 
of phone tapping, the Commission nationale de contrôle des interceptions de 
sécurité, and the classification of defence secrets, the Commission consultative du 
secret de la défense nationale, is an even more tangible sign that attitudes towards 
the appropriate role of the state have changed. Traditionally, the French state 
has maintained close control over ‘high’ politics, including issues relating to 
national security. The fact that the French government has decided to delegate 
decision-making authority to quasi-autonomous agencies in some aspects of 
this domain is an indication that the state tradition argument is not appropriate 
in this regard at least. 
 
How Are AAIs Structured? 
 
 AAIs comprise a very heterogeneous set of institutions. As a result, 
and given space constraints, it is impossible to go into any great detail about 
how they are structured. That said, two observations can be made. 
The first observation concerns the structure of their boards of 
governors. Here, it is noticeable that political appointees can be found on many 
of these boards. In some cases, such as the Autorité de régulation des 
télécommunications (ART), all the board members are appointed by political 
representatives. In other cases, such as the Commission de la sécurité des 
consommateurs (CSC), the percentage of political appointees is relatively small. 
The fact that AAIs often include political appointees on their boards provides 
some support for the political uncertainty hypothesis. It might be argued that 
governments are aware of the fact that they will lose office at some time and so 
construct AAIs in such a way that they can still maintain a majority on their 
boards. That said, another noticeable feature about AAIs is that political 
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appointees are often required to have professional expertise. So, for example, 
only ‘qualified’ people can be appointed to ART’s board and collectively its 
members are required to have expertise in law, technical issues and the 
economy. The prevalence of this ‘expertise’ requirement provides support for 
the policy complexity argument. That is to say, in many cases the government 
has expressly delegated authority to policy experts. What is more, in typical 
French fashion, members of the grands corps are often appointed to the boards 
of governors. These people are civil servants, but they are members of the 
highest administrative institutions in the land, notably the Conseil d’État, the 
Cour des Comptes, and the Cour de Cassation, and are experts in matters relating 
to law, including administrative law, and public finances. Thus, there is further 
evidence for the complexity argument. Finally, there is also evidence for the 
credible commitment hypothesis. In many cases, the boards include external 
representatives. For example, the CSC includes representatives of consumer 
groups and professional associations. In this way, it might be argument that 
government have delegated authority to institutions that are populated by 
people with no strategic interest in either the government or the state. This is 
entirely consistent with the credible commitment hypothesis. 
The second observation is that many AAIs are able to exercise quite 
considerable powers. True, there are some that are relatively toothless. Most 
notably, the Commission d’accès aux documents administratifs has only an 
advisory role. Equally, the role of the various ombudsman institutions, see 
above, is relatively limited. Most AAIs, though, have the power to make a 
range of decisions, including the imposition of sanctions. This point is 
particularly important in regard to the credible commitment hypothesis. The 
creation of an AAI is not sufficient in itself to show that governments wish to 
avoid any future intervention in the policy process. In order to make such a 
commitment a credible one, governments need to transfer some significant 
degree of powers to the authorities in question. It is beyond the scope of this 
article to demonstrate that governments have done, even though this issue will 
be addressed in the case studies that follow. In general terms, though, it can be 
asserted that most AAIs have considerable decision-making responsibilities 
and are not just examples of political window-dressing. 
 
What General Reasons Are Given as to Why AAIs Have Been Created? 
 
 In the literature on AAIs, the most common reason that is put forward 
to explain why they have been created is the idea that governments are 
responding to new policy problems and, specifically, to a more complex 
decision-making environment. For example, Teitgen-Colly (1988, 24) argues 
AAIs “are, in effect, a new way in which the public powers are responding to 
the problems that they face in certain policy sectors”. More specifically, she 
refers to the “complexification” of social life as a factor that explains their 
creation (ibid., 27). Similarly, Guédon (1991, 16) writes that AAIs “were a 
response either to the emergence of new problems or to problems that had 
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become more acute; they were a sign that traditional state structures were 
unable to respond to the evolving and more complex set of societal problems 
with which the state was faced”. Gentot (1994, 38) discusses their creation in 
the context of “technological revolutions” over which citizens had no control. 
Jean-Jacques Daigre (2002, 8) writes “everything starts from the observation 
that the State was no longer really able to regulate a certain number of 
activities because of their technical nature …”. All told, there is no doubt that 
those who write about AAIs provide evidence that supports the policy 
complexity hypothesis. 
 Another very common reason that is used to explain the creation of 
AAIs is that they are part of the response to make political action more 
credible. In this regard, it is worth quoting Guédon at length. She writes (1991, 
24): “The essential objective is to engage in certain sectors in activity that is 
separate from the influence of political power, meaning executive power. The 
‘crisis of the State’ and the discrediting of political life have combined to 
weaken the credibility of public power”. In its official report, the Conseil d’État 
(2001, 275) also emphasises this reason. The report states that AAIs are created 
so as to “offer public opinion a reinforced guarantee of the impartiality of the 
State’s actions …”.  The report then goes on to link the complexity and credible 
commitment hypotheses (ibid., 276). AAIs, it is stated, are created to “associate 
professionals with the process of determining the rules that are applicable in 
technical areas, a process which, in order to be credible, requires the support of 
economic actors …”. Again, there is no doubt that the literature on AAIs 
supports the credible commitment hypothesis. 
 The situation is somewhat less clear in regard to the new public 
management hypothesis. In some respects, much of the language that has been 
used to describe the creation of AAIs is perfectly compatible with the general 
thrust of the new public management literature. For example, one of the first 
writers on the subject emphasised that AAIs were part of “a new vision of 
State/society relations” (Chevallier, 1989, 178) and were a sign that “a pluralist 
vision of the State” was beginning to emerge (ibid., 178). For another writer, 
AAIs were a manifestation of the desire to establish a “more modest state” 
(Demarigny 1996, 158). Guédon (1991, 26) states that AAIs “seem to be the sign 
of a new type of relationship between the administrative and the political”. 
Even though the language is compatible with the new public management 
hypothesis, writers do not explicitly make reference to this factor as an 
explanatory variable. In part, this may simply be because in comparative 
perspective the overall level of public sector reform in France is not very great 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000, 231). Whatever the reason, while the evidence 
suggests that new public management norms may be consistent with the 
decision to create AAIs, there is little evidence to suggest that such norms were 
an explicit part of the decision to delegate authority. 
 In addition to these reasons, other reasons are mentioned less 
frequently, but nonetheless seem to have some relevance. In this regard, the 
impact of institutional isomorphism has been implied by a number of authors. 
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Perhaps most explicitly, the Conseil d’État (2001, 270) suggested that foreign 
agencies, such as US Securities and Exchange Commission, acted as a model 
that France adopted. The Conseil d’État (ibid., 271-274) also made explicit 
reference to the impact of the European Union on the decision to create AAIs. 
In addition, one author hints at blame shifting as a possible motivation. 
Georges Dupuis (1988, 17) talks, cynically, about the “cowardice of power”. He 
states that Pontius Pilate may act as a role model for certain politicians and that 
it is a natural temptation for them to “wash their hands” of difficult problems. 
While the language is a little undiplomatic and no specific evidence is 
provided to back up the claims, the implication is clear. 
 Table 3 summarises the findings in this section. In general terms, there 
was strong evidence to support the credible commitment, policy complexity 
and institutional isomorphism hypotheses. There was also a limited degree of 
evidence to support the political entrepreneurship, political uncertainty, blame 
shifting and spread of new public management reforms hypotheses. By 
contrast, there was evidence that contradicted the state tradition hypothesis. 
 
[ TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
Explaining the Creation of AAIs:  The Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel and 
the Commission de Régulation de l’Électricité 
 
 In this section, we deepen the level of analysis. We have chosen to 
examine the circumstances surrounding the creation of two particular AAIs, 
the Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA), the broadcasting regulator, and the 
Commission de régulation de l’électricité (CRE), the electricity regulator. These 
institutions have their counterparts in other countries. As a result, we cannot 
be accused of stacking the deck against certain explanations by focusing on 
relatively idiosyncratic agencies that perhaps only exist in the French case. 
What is more, in the French literature on AAIs the CRE is usually classified as 
an economic regulator, while the CSA is often classed as a social regulator. 
Thus, they operate in the two general areas that are often identified in the 
literature on this topic. Finally, the CSA was established in 1989, whereas the 
CRE was created in 2000. Therefore, if there has been a change in the 
motivations for the creation of AAIs over time, we may be able to capture this 
change by looking at these two institutions. Overall, we do not claim that the 
CRE and the CSA are typical of AAIs as a whole, but we would claim that they 
do not bias the findings in favour of particular hypotheses and that there is 
sufficient variation between them for the salience of the different hypotheses to 
be tested. 
Having chosen the two case studies, we focus on the parliamentary 
debate that took place at the time of their creation and try to identify the 
motivations of the decision-makers at the time. More specifically, we follow the 
debates that took place in the National Assembly and examine the arguments 
put forward by both the government and opposition. The law that created the 
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CSA was debated in the lower house on the 5, 6 and 15 December 1988. The 
law that created the CRE was debated there on the 28 January, 16, 17, 18 and 19 
February and 2 March 1999. The 1988 law was almost solely confined to the 
establishment of the CSA, while the creation of the CRE was only part of the 
1999 law. As a result, in the latter case we will concentrate on those parts of the 
debate that dealt directly with the CRE. In both cases, we try to summarise the 
arguments that were put forward to determine the level of support for each of 
the eight hypotheses identified in section one. 
 
The Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel 
 
 The debate in the National Assembly concerning the creation of the 
CSA was instructive in a number of ways. Specifically, four observations can 
be made. 
 The first observation is that in the case of the CSA there was little or no 
supporting evidence for two hypotheses: the spread of new public 
management reforms and blame shifting. Evidence for the spread of new 
public management reform hypothesis would have been found if deputies had 
discussed the creation of the CSA in the context of wider administrative 
reforms. However, at no point did they do so. So, we can discount this 
hypothesis. The same is true for the blame-shifting hypothesis. Even if we 
assume that a government is unlikely to reveal publicly that blame shifting is 
one of its motivations, what is noticeable is that at no point in the debate did 
the opposition try to suggest that the government had this motivation in mind. 
So, there was no evidence for this hypothesis. 
The second observation is that there was limited evidence to support 
two hypotheses: policy complexity and institutional isomorphism. On two 
occasions, the complexity of the policy area was implied. At the very start of 
the debate, the government’s main rapporteur, Jean-Jacques Queyranne, 
justified the bill by saying that the organisation and structures of the 
broadcasting sector had been “overtaken by the very rapid changes” that had 
affected the area (Assemblée nationale, compte rendu intégral (henceforth, 
ACRI), 5 December, 1988, 3097). The rapporteur of one of the parliamentary 
committees, Jean-Pierre Michel, provided the same justification, stating that the 
reasons for yet another bill in this policy sector was because of the 
“technological evolution” in this sector (ACRI, 5 December, 1988, 3102). 
There is also limited evidence to support the institutional isomorphism 
hypothesis. In this regard, it should be noted that Europeanisation was not a 
motivation. Indeed, one of the government’s main spokespeople, Bernard 
Schreiner, stated that the government would wait until 1992, and the creation 
of the Single European Market, to take another look at the CSA’s role in the 
area of telecommunications regulation. So, European integration was only in 
the background at this time. That said, the government did note the 
importance of policy transfer in other respects. For example, the government’s 
decision not to give the CSA powers to regulate the telecommunications sector 
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was justified on the basis that this was the situation in other countries such 
as Japan, Britain, Germany and Spain (ACRI, 5 December, 1988, 3104), 
although it might be noted that the opposition, which wanted the CSA to be 
given powers in this area, cited the experience of countries where the 
broadcasting regulator did have powers in the telecommunications sector 
(ACRI, 6 December, 1988, 3200). Equally, on a number of occasions Schreiner 
justified the way in which members of the CSA’s board would be appointed by 
saying that an equivalent process was used in countries like the US, Britain and 
Canada (ACRI, 6 December, 1988, 3121-22, 3170 and 3189). All in all, while 
there is not strong evidence to support the institutional isomorphism 
hypothesis, there is at least some evidence that the government was motivated 
by reasons of cross-national policy transfer. 
The third observation is that there is good evidence to support the 
political leadership hypothesis. During the 1988 presidential election 
campaign, President Mitterrand promised to abolish the existing regulator, the 
CNCL, and replace it with a new authority. Indeed, in his de facto election 
manifesto, Lettre à tous les Français, Mitterrand even gave the CSA its name 
(Mitterrand 1988, 14). It must be remembered that the President is 
constitutionally prohibited from taking part in parliamentary debates. Even so, 
it is noticeable that throughout the National Assembly debate, Mitterrand’s 
name was closely associated with the reform. For example, Jean-Jacques 
Queyranne quoted Mitterrand as part of his justification for abolishing the 
CNCL (ACRI, 5 December, 1988, 3098). The junior minister with responsibility 
for the bill, Catherine Tasca, quoted Mitterrand at length when she tried to 
justify the controversial way in which the government proposed to appoint the 
board of the CSA (ACRI, 6 December, 1988, 3163). In fact, so frequent were the 
references to the President that at one point the opposition noted ironically that 
the Lettre à tous les Français had already acquired almost “biblical” status 
(ACRI, 15 December, 1988, 3695). In these ways, there is no doubt that 
Mitterrand was directly responsible for the creation of the CSA. This provides 
support for the political leadership hypothesis. 
The final observation concerns three hypotheses – the policy 
uncertainty hypothesis, the state tradition hypothesis and the credible 
commitment hypothesis – where the evidence is mixed. The policy uncertainty 
hypothesis is a good case in point. The usual evidence to support this thesis is 
found in the idea that governments will create non-majoritarian institutions in 
the period immediately prior to an election that they know they will lose in 
order to ensure that the new government cannot control the policy sector in 
question when it comes to power. Given that the CSA was created immediately 
after a new government was elected, the usual evidence to support his thesis is 
absent. That said, there is still some evidence consistent with the policy 
uncertainty hypothesis. As we have already noted, the composition of CSA 
was a particularly controversial issue. The government proposed that there 
would be six members of the board and that the President of the Republic, the 
President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate would each 
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make two appointments. To the extent that the socialists controlled two of 
these three offices at the time, the opposition repeatedly accused the 
government of trying to ensure that the socialists would a majority on the new 
authority in the future. (For example, ACRI, 8 December, 1988, 3177). Needless 
to say, the government defended itself very strongly against this charge, but 
we can say that there is at least limited evidence to support the policy 
uncertainty hypothesis. 
The situation with regard to the state tradition hypothesis is similar. 
The CSA was one of the first AAIs to be created. Perhaps as a result, the CSA 
was not portrayed as being part of a French tradition of delegation to non-
majoritarian institutions. Indeed, Catherine Tasca stated that the principle of 
creating an independent and effective regulator in the broadcasting area was 
“new” (ACRI, 5 December, 1988, 3128). All the same, throughout the debate the 
government made reference to the first broadcasting regulator, the Haute 
Autorité, which had been established by the socialist government in 1982. 
Repeatedly, the government claimed that the Haute Autorité had broken with 
the French tradition of state-controlled media and argued that the CSA was 
following in its footsteps. (For example, ACRI, 5 December, 1988, 3102, and the 
intervention by Jean-Pierre Michel). It must be noted that equally repeatedly 
the opposition, which had abolished the Haute Autorité in 1986 and replaced it 
with the CNCL, took issue with this argument, stating that there was no need 
to abolish the CNCL and arguing that whereas the CNCL was independent the 
CSA would not be. (For example, Gérard Longuet, ACRI, 5 December, 1988, 
3115). All in all, as we might expect, the parliamentary debate provides 
evidence of claim and counter-claim. Even so, if we assume that the 1982 
reform had started a new tradition and that the 1988 bill was another 
manifestation of this new tradition, then the fact that the government did at 
least try to justify the creation of the CSA by reference to the Haute Autorité 
does provide limited evidence for the state tradition hypothesis. 
The same conclusion can be drawn in relation to the credible 
commitment hypothesis. The opposition criticised the CSA, arguing that the 
board would be composed of political appointees and that the regulator had 
not been given sufficient powers. Indeed, at one point an opposition 
spokesperson explicitly stated that the CSA’s credibility could be reinforced if 
it were to be given greater powers (ACRI, 5 December, 1988, 3147). As a 
rejoinder, Bernard Schreiner accused the CNCL of lacking “authority and 
credibility” (ACRI, 5 December, 1988, 3115). Moreover, he defended the 
credibility of the CSA, particularly in relation to the composition of its board 
(ACRI, 7 December, 1988, 3311). In fact, the parliamentary debate as a whole 
was characterised by the government arguing that the CSA would be 
independent - and, hence, credible - and the opposition arguing that it would 
not. What are we to conclude from this war of words? We should conclude that 
the credible commitment hypothesis is not strongly supported. The 
government did not justify the creation of the CSA in the usual terms of 
establishing a credible commitment in the context of market opening. At the 
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same time, though, the government did try to argue that it was creating an 
independent regulatory and did make explicit reference to the concept of 
credibility on a couple of occasions. So, there is limited support for the credible 
commitment hypothesis. 
 
The Commission de Régulation de l’Électricité 
 
 As with the CSA, the debate in the National Assembly was instructive 
as to the various motivations for the creation of the CRE. This time, three 
observations can be made. 
 The first observation is that in the case of the CRE there was little or no 
supporting evidence for either the political leadership hypothesis, the spread of 
new public management reform hypothesis, the blame-shifting hypothesis, or 
the political uncertainty hypothesis. There was absolutely no evidence to 
support either the political leadership hypothesis, or the spread of new public 
management reform hypothesis. At no point in the debate was the creation of 
the CRE associated with any given political leader, nor was it considered in the 
context of a wider set of administrative reforms. So, we can discount these 
hypotheses entirely. We can do the same for the blame-shifting hypothesis. As 
with the CSA, there was no attempt by the opposition to claim that the 
government was trying to shift the blame for unpopular policies to the CRE. 
The situation with regard to the political uncertainty hypothesis is more 
interesting, even if the conclusion is the same. Like the CSA, the CRE was not 
created in the immediate run up to an election. So, the sort of evidence that is 
usually called upon to support this hypothesis is once again absent. That said, 
most of the members of the CRE’s board are political appointees. Therefore, as 
with the CSA, we might have expected the opposition to accuse the 
government of trying to create an institution that it could control even when it 
lost power in the future. However, this did not happen. An amendment was 
tabled to reform the composition of the CRE’s board (ANCRI, 18 February, 
1999, 1776), but the whole exercise was a rather half-hearted affair. In contrast 
to the extremely acrimonious debate surrounding the creation of the CSA more 
than a decade earlier, at no point on this occasion did the opposition accuse the 
government of trying to find ways of keeping the CRE under its long-term 
political control. So, we can put aside the political uncertainty hypothesis. 
 The second observation is that there is only a limited degree of support 
for the policy complexity and state tradition hypotheses. As regards the 
former, one of the parliamentary rapporteurs for the bill argued that any 
regulatory authority must have the “capacity for expertise” (ANCRI, 18 
February, 1999, 1773). To the extent that he was defending the creation of the 
CRE, this can be taken as at least some support for the idea that the policy 
complexity was relevant to the creation of the CRE. By the same token, on a 
couple of occasions the opposition argued that the government had not given 
the CRE sufficient resources in regard to expertise, thus implying that policy 
complexity was important in this area (ANCRI, 16 February, 1999, 1499; and 17 
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February, 1999, 1571). All the same, at no point did the government cite the 
complexity of the policy area as one of its motivations for the creation of the 
CRE. So, the level of support for this hypothesis is limited. The situation is very 
similar with regard to the state tradition hypothesis. At one point in the debate, 
a parliamentary rapporteur noted that the CRE was just one of a number of 
regulatory authorities and said that deputies had been “quick” to resort to the 
creation of “so-called ‘independent’ authorities” in recent years (ANCRI, 16 
February, 1999, 1485). Unlike the situation with the CSA in 1988, this statement 
supports the idea that there is now a tradition of establishing independent 
authorities in the French system. In this way, there is some support for the state 
tradition hypothesis. All the same, the level of support is low. 
 The third observation relates to the credible commitment and 
institutional isomorphism hypotheses. There was explicit support for the 
credible commitment hypothesis. Indeed, on two occasions the issue of 
credibility was explicitly mentioned. A parliamentary rapporteur noted that 
“the mode of regulation is a cardinal element in the success of the reform” and 
that “what France does will be judged by the credibility of it…” (ANCRI, 16 
February, 1999, 1482). Similarly, the Secretary of State responsible for the bill 
stated that the role of the CRE was “indispensable” to the credibility of the 
market-opening process (ANCRI, 16 February, 1999, 1496). This sort of 
language provides good support for the credible commitment hypothesis. That 
said, on many occasions the Minister made it very clear that he was only 
willing to give the CRE regulatory powers in certain areas and argued strongly 
that the government needed to maintain responsibility for the regulation of 
various aspects of the policy sector. (See, for example, ANCRI, 18 February, 
1999, 1775). So, when the opposition tried to extend the powers of the authority 
their amendments were rejected, which on a couple of occasions led to some 
fairly sarcastic remarks about the supposed independence of the CRE. (See 
ANCRI, 18 February, 1999, 1685; and 18 February, 1999, 1703). Given the 
opposition’s doubts as to the independence of the CRE, this casts some doubt 
on the evidence for this hypothesis. All in all, while the support for the credible 
commitment hypothesis is not unequivocal, there is good evidence that it was 
an explicit motivation of the government. 
 The situation with regard to the institutional isomorphism hypothesis 
is similar. There is good evidence to support this hypothesis. The bill as whole 
was motivated by the requirement for the French government to transpose 
Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. 
On countless occasions, the government stated that this was the context in 
which the bill was being proposed. Moreover, explicit mention of the CRE was 
made in this regard (ANCRI, 18 February, 1999, 1773). Further evidence to 
support this hypothesis relates to the concept of policy transfer more generally. 
On more than one occasion, the government implied that the institutional 
architecture of the CRE was inspired by equivalent authorities both in Europe 
(ANCRI, 18 February, 1999, 1702) and the world more generally (ANCRI, 16 
 16 
February, 1999, 1495). Equally, at one point a parliamentary rapporteur stated 
that specific aspects of the CRE’s powers had been inspired directly by the 
Authority for the Regulation of Telecommunications, which had been 
established a short time previously (ANCRI, 18 February, 1999, 1787). In all 
these ways, there is good evidence that the creation of the CRE was motivated 
by a general trend towards cross-national, or cross-sector, policy transfer. That 
said, evidence in support of this hypothesis does need to be qualified 
somewhat. It should be noted that Directive 96/92 required the creation of a 
regulatory authority that was separate from electricity suppliers, but not one 
that was independent from the government. So, the government’s decision to 
create an AAI in this area was not necessarily a European requirement. Indeed, 
on occasions the government made a virtue of the fact that the government had 
a degree of flexibility as to how the directive was transposed. (For example, 
ANCRI, 16 February, 1999, 1495). By the same token, even though the 
government admitted that it had studied the organisation of electricity 
regulators in other countries, it was also stated that they constituted a 
“disparate” set of institutions and so the government was justified in choosing 
its own form of institutional architecture (ANCRI, 18 February, 1999, 1773). 
Finally, even if some of the CRE’s powers resembled those of the 
telecommunications regulator, more often than not the government stressed 
the electricity sector was different from the telecommunications sector 
(ANCRI, 18 February, 1999, 1774) and indeed that the electricity sector was 
“specific” (ANCRI, 18 February, 1999, 1702). Overall, we can conclude by 
saying that there is strong prima facie evidence for the institutional 
isomorphism hypothesis, but that some of this evidence should be qualified 
somewhat. 
 
[ TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
Conclusion 
 
There are various explanations as to why governments should decide to 
delegate authority to quasi-autonomous agencies. Some of these explanations 
are based on a transactions cost approach. Others emphasise more contextual 
factors. To date, only a small number of these explanations have been 
systematically tested and, even then, attention has tended to focus on a 
relatively small number of more quantitatively tractable hypotheses. This 
paper has helped to fill this gap. 
The existing work has provided considerable support for both the 
credible commitment and policy complexity hypotheses. The qualitative work 
in this article has suggested that these hypotheses remain strong. At both the 
general level and in the two case studies, evidence consistent with both 
explanations was found. This finding is important. Given there is now 
quantitative and qualitative evidence to support both hypotheses, their 
salience is strengthened. The need to delegate decision making to 
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acknowledged experts and, in particular, the desire to make a credible 
commitment really do seem to explain in large part why non-majoritarian 
institutions are created. 
In addition, this paper has also demonstrated support for other 
explanations. Perhaps most notably, there was good all-round evidence to back 
up the institutional isomorphism hypothesis. This evidence was apparent in 
both the general study of all 34 AAIs as well as in the case studies, particularly 
as regards the CRE. This finding is important because the institutional 
isomorphism hypothesis is not easily tractable in statistical terms. In addition, 
there was evidence in both the general study and the case studies to support 
the political uncertainty and political leadership hypotheses. Again, evidence 
for the latter is particularly important because this hypothesis has not proved 
amenable to statistical tests. That said, we perhaps need to qualify the strength 
of the evidence for the political leadership hypothesis. The main evidence for it 
lay in the fact that a large proportion of AAIs were created under two 
governments and because the CSA was closely associated with François 
Mitterrand. The former evidence is not compelling and the latter is perhaps 
institution-specific. Even so, the study has provided at least some evidence for 
an explanation, support for which, so far, has not been found elsewhere. 
Finally, there was only very limited evidence for the blame-shifting 
hypothesis, the state tradition hypothesis and the spread of new public 
management reforms hypothesis. There was very limited evidence to support 
the blame-shifting hypothesis in both elements of the study. However, in each 
case, the evidence was either limited or equivocal. By the same token, an 
argument could be made that there may now be a growing tradition of 
delegation to AAIs in France. In this way, the state tradition argument may be 
more applicable to France in the future than it has been up to now. In general, 
though, the state tradition hypothesis was only weakly supported in this study. 
For its part, there was some evidence consistent with the spread of new public 
management reforms hypothesis in the general study, but none in the case 
studies. Again, on the whole this hypothesis can be largely discounted. 
Overall, these findings are also important. These hypotheses correspond to 
arguments that have been put forward in the literature but which have not 
been amenable to statistical tests. Therefore, even though evidence had not yet 
been found to support them, they were still plausible. Now, though, we have 
tried to test them and little evidence was found to support them. So, while we 
have to acknowledge that this study was based on one set of institutions in one 
country, these hypotheses appear to be the least applicable as things stand. 
All in all, this article has helped to explain why governments have 
established so many AAIs in France. More than that, it has also helped to 
strengthen or weaken the validity of the various reasons that are put forward 
to explain the delegation of authority to quasi-autonomous agencies in general. 
In this latter regard, it has raised certain questions that need to be explored 
more fully, but it has helped to advance the received wisdom in this area. 
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TABLE 1 
Hypotheses Explaining Delegation to Quasi-Autonomous Agencies. 
 
1. Policy complexity/the increased efficiency of rule making 
2. Credible commitment 
3. Blame shifting 
4. Political uncertainty 
5. Institutional isomorphism, including Europeanisation 
6. State tradition 
7. Political entrepreneurship 
8. The spread of new public management norms 
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 TABLE 2 
Data relating to the creation of AAIs during the Fifth Republic. 
 
 
Under which presidencies were AAIs created? 
 
de Gaulle 
(1958-69) 
1 
Pompidou 
(1969-74) 
0 
Giscard d’Estaing 
(1974-81) 
5 
Mitterrand 
(1981-95) 
15 
Chirac 
(1995-end 2000) 
10 
 
Under which types of premiership were AAIs created? 
 
Left-wing 
 
12 
Cohabitation with 
left-wing PM 
6 
Right-wing 
 
10 
Cohabitation with 
right-wing PM 
3 
 
Under which premierships were AAIs created? 
 
Rocard 
(1988-
1991) 
7 
Jospin 
(1997- 
end 2000) 
6 
Barre 
(1976-
1981) 
5 
Mauroy 
(1981-
1984) 
4 
Juppé 
(1995-
1997) 
4 
Chirac 
(1986-
1988) 
3 
Pompidou 
(1962-
1968) 
1 
Bérégovoy 
(1992-
1993) 
1 
 
At what point in the electoral cycle were AAIs established? 
 
More than 12 months before  
a scheduled election 
25 
Fewer than 12 months before  
a scheduled election 
6 
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TABLE 3 
Summary of the findings for all 34 AAIs. 
 
 When created Areas Structure Reasons 
Policy complexity No evidence Limited 
evidence 
Good 
evidence 
Good 
evidence 
Credible 
commitment 
No evidence Good 
evidence 
Good 
evidence 
Good 
evidence 
Blame shifting Not applicable No evidence No 
evidence 
Limited 
evidence 
Political 
uncertainty 
Limited evidence No evidence Good 
evidence 
No evidence 
Institutional 
isomorphism 
Limited evidence Limited 
evidence 
No 
evidence 
Limited 
evidence 
State tradition No evidence Evidence 
against 
No 
evidence 
No evidence 
Political leadership Limited evidence No evidence No 
evidence 
No evidence 
Spread of NPM 
norms 
Evidence for and 
against 
Limited 
evidence 
No 
evidence 
Limited 
evidence 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Summary of the findings for the CSA and CRE. 
 
 CSA CRE 
Policy complexity Limited evidence Limited evidence 
Credible commitment Limited evidence Good evidence 
Blame shifting No evidence No evidence 
Political uncertainty Limited evidence No evidence 
Institutional isomorphism Limited evidence Good evidence 
State tradition Limited evidence Limited evidence 
Political leadership Good evidence No evidence 
Spread of NPM norms No evidence No evidence 
 
